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et al.: COMMENTS

COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -INVASION OF PRIVACY BY
FICTIONALIZATION OF AN EXPERIENCENO RECOVERY ABSENT MALICE*
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,' the plaintiff brought an action under
a New York right of privacy statute alleging that Life magazine
falsely reported that a play portrayed an experience as that
suffered by the plaintiff and his family while being held captive by escaped convicts. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press required that a
verdict of liability be predicated only on a finding of knowing
or reckless falsity in the publication of the article, and the
defendant was entitled to an instruction to that effect. Consequently, the judgment rendered below was set aside and the case
remanded for failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury
accordingly.
Since the genesis of the "right of privacy," 2 four distinct
kinds of invasion of as many different interests of the plaintiff
have emerged under this single tort, having nothing in common
except that each represents an interference with the right of
the plaintiff "to be let alone."3
The four actionable invasions are:
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion, or into his private affairs.
(2) Public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff.
(3)Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
(4) Appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantage,
4
of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
As a result of the New York courts' refusal to recognize the
right of privacy as a part of the common law," New York
* Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).
1. 87 Sup. Ct 534 (1967).
2. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193

(1890). This famous article is credited with creating the right of privacy.
3. PRossEa, ToRTs § 112 at 832 (3d ed. 1964).

4. PROSSEE, ToRTs § 112 (3d ed. 1964).
5. About thirty states have so recognized the right of privacy as embedded
in the common law, with an additional four states creating the right by
statute. South Carolina is in the former group; Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of
Va., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E2d 169 (1939).
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enacted legislation according the right of privacy to her citizens.
Section 50 of the New York Civil Rights Law reads as follows:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or
picture of any living person without having first obtained
the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 51 provides for the civil remedies of injunction and

damages for such an invasion.6
The New York legislature having thus provided the impetus,
the courts were quick to establish that the publication of fiction
relating to an individual is a use of his name for purposes of
trade, the commercial element being furnished by the mere sale
of the article. Therefore, when the name or likeness of a person
is accompanied by false statements about him, or when he is put
in a false light before the public, the statutory elements as
viewed by the courts have been satisfied7 In this effort to
encourage accuracy in the press, the New York court has, in fact,
recognized and applied a right of privacy designed to prevent
publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the eyes of
the public by using a statute directed at redressing unauthorized
invasions by an appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness
8
for the defendant's benefit or advantage.
The justification for establishing safeguards against the type
of privacy invasion in the principal case is to afford protection
to one who may be a public figure or who has been involuntarily
thrust in the public eye from having either his personality or
experience fictionaZized and commercially exploited. 9 Although
New York's definition is founded in statute, the implications
are far-reaching because only so far as "the statute itself limits
the extent of the right, the New York decisions are quite consistent with the common law .

.

. in other states, and they are

customarily cited in privacy cases throughout the country."1 °
Prior to New York Timesv. Sulivan,'1 libel law was in the
exclusive domain of the state under the ciail law and her court
6. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 51.
7. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 406 (1960).
8. Ibid.
9. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274

N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966).
10. PnossmE, op. cit. mipra note 4, at 830.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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was the final arbiter. However, the Supreme Court, in that case
and in subsequent cases, 12 decided that state libel laws could
not be interpreted as allowing a public officiaZ to maintain a
suit for criticism of his conduct in that capacity absent actual
malice. This marked departure was influenced by the social
interest involved in allowing free and unencumbered discussion
of public issues. The Supreme Court, aware of the growing number of libel suits resulting from the civil rights movement, was
fearful that substantial damage awards might restrain the press
in its discussion of a burning social issue.'8 Impelled by this
fear, the Court held that the Alabama courts in Sullivan failed
to provide the necessary safeguards for freedom of speech and
of the press that are required by the first and fourteenth amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics
of his official conduct.' 4 The Court was confronted with the
seemingly cogent argument that the fourteenth amendment is
directed at state action,'5 and had no application to this case
inasmuch as this was a civil lawsuit between private parties.' 6
However, the Court found "state action" in the application by
the Alabama courts of a state rule of law' 7 that was violative
of the inherent rights of speech and press accorded to all citizens
by the first amendment.
The instant case represents a still deeper penetration by the
Supreme Court into tort law. Again, using a "state action"
approach to gain scrutiny of the New York court's decision, the
Court expanded the malice test announced in SuZlivan to govern
invasion of privacy suits alleging fictionalization. While the
appellee in Hill was regarded by the Court to be a newsworthy
person substantially without a right of privacy insofar as his
actual experience as a hostage was concerned, a right of action
was acknowledged insofar as that experience was fictionalized
12. See, e.g., Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) ; Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
13. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-72 (1964).

14. Id. at 279-80.
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States....

."

(Emphasis added).

16. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
17. The court deemed it inconsequential that the rule of law in question was
bottomed in the common law and applied in a civil action involving private
parties. "The test is not the form in which state power has been applied
but . . . whether such power has in fact been exercised." Id. at 697.
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and exploited for defendant's commercial benefit.1 s However,
the Court raised an obstacle to recovery by requiring as a condition precedent to a successful action that the plaintiff prove
that the fictionalization was done with malice, i.e., a knowing
or reckless fasity.19
The respective directions of the first amendment freedom of
speech and press and the right of privacy afforded by state law
had been for some time moving toward a confrontation. The
decision in Hill left no doubt as to which must yield. This determination prompts new queries now as to what further areas
traditionally in the state domain will be brought within the
ambit of the first amendment's protections. In all probability,
the malice rule, 20 as applied to a public official in Sullivan, will
be enlarged to bring inside its perimeter libel suits by public
figures as well. Most notable in this trend is Walkerv. CourierJournal & Louisville Times Go.21 in which the district court
recognized that General Walker was not a public official but
considered the rule applicable to any person of national prominence and influence. 22 On the other hand, some district courts
have been less eager to expand the application of the rule
beyond Sllivan.23 The Supreme Court is expected to resolve
the question in the immediate future.
In regard to the invasion of privacy area, the invasion by
public disclosure of private facts2 4 may well be the next conquest
of the malice test. The Court could require a knowing or reckless
disregard of the rights of others 25 before a recovery could be
had. While the law in this area is in a state of flux, it is abundantly clear, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's imposing
eagerness to enter the tort field, that the news media will continue to be provided with substantial "breathing space" and
latitude to assure uninhibited publication of the news.
ARTHRm GREGoRy
18. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup. Ct 534, 541 (1967).
19. Justices Black and Douglas favored an absolute freedom of press guarantee but acquiesced in the decision to reach this particular result. Id. at 547
(J. Black, concurring) 549 (J. Douglas, concurring).
20. A requirement of a knowing or reckless falsity.

21. 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
22. Id. at 234.
23. Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965); Figaole v. Curtis

Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
24. Pnossan, op. cit. s1pra note 4, § 112.
25. De Ronde v. Gaytime Shops, 239 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1957).
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MISCEGENATION STATUTES
VALIDITY SUSTAINED AGAINST DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES*

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

Miscegenation is "mixture of races; marriage between persons
of different races; as between a white person and a negro."'
Statutes prohibiting this practice have been in existence in this
country some 300 years-the first having been enacted in Maryland in 1661.2 These statutes had no counterpart in English
history and probably were enacted in America because of the
moral indignation of the colonists over marriages between African slaves and white women.8 They were termed by Mr. Chief
Justice Laney, speaking for the majority in the Dred Scott
decision, examples of "perpetual and impassable barrier[s] ...
erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery . .. and looked upon as so far below them in

the scale of created things that intermarriages between white
persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural
and immoral . . .
N4
Nevertheless,
anti-miscegenation legislation has existed in thirty-eight states at one time or another 5
and has even been sustained as the codification of "the natural
law which forbids intermarriage and that social amalgamation
which leads to a corruption of the races .

.

. ,,(In the same

vein the Supreme Court of Georgia extolled the virtue of such
legislation in proclaiming that "from the tallest archangel in
Heaven, down to the meanest reptile on earth, moral and social
inequalities exist, and must continue to exist through all eternity."7 One court, in shying away from such philosophical discussion and attempting to predicate justification for the statute
of its state on a scientific foundation, declared, somewhat ludicrously, that "it is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the
issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and
a black woman intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny, and such a fact sufficiently justifies those laws ... forbid* Loving v. Virginia, 206 Va. 924, 147 S.E,2d 78 (1966).

1. BLAcx,

LAW

DiCriONARY (4th ed. 1951).

2. Proceedings of the General Assembly of Maryland 1637-1664, at 533-34.

3. Cummins & Kane, Miscegenation, The Constitution, and Science, 38
DIcTA 24, 27 (1961).
4. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 691, 702 (1856).
5. Applebaum, Miscegenagion Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Prob-

lemn, 53 GEo. L. J.49, 50 (1964).
6. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (1871), quoting from Philadelphia &
West Chester R.R. v. Miles, 2 AM. LAW Rxv. 358.
7. Scott v. Georgia, 39'Ga. 323, 326 (1869).

258
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ding miscegenation."" Although not quite so extreme, another
argument couched in such physiological terms was that "the offspring of these unnatural connections are generally sickly and
effeminate and . . . inferior in physical development and
strength, to the full-blood of either race." 9
Obviously the rationale of the preceding statements leave
something to be desired. This defect notwithstanding, however,
these statutes have, until recent years, withstood virtually every
attack upon their validity ° in both state"1 and federal courts.' 2
Such attacks generally took the form of charges that the statutes
constituted a violation or impairment of one or more of the following: the Civil Rights Act of 1866,'8 the privileges and immunities clause, 1 4 the contracts clause,' 5 the equal protection
clause' 6 and the due process clause.Y7
8. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
9. Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 323, 326 (1869).
10. In 1872 the Supreme Court of Alabama struck down a law of that state
prohibiting intermarriage of white persons and negroes as being repugnant to
fourteenth amendment. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872). This decision
was short lived, however, and was reversed just five years later with the
court holding that "manifestly, it is for the peace and happiness of the black
race, as well as of the white, that such laws should exist." Green v. State,
58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877).
11. E.g., Green v. State, supra note 10; State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P2d
882 (1942) ; Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895) ; Jackson v. City
and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942) ; In re Shun T.
Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942); State v. Ross, 76
N.C. 242 (1877).
12. E.g., Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944) ; State v.
Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890); Ex parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 669
(No. 5047) (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879) ; In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6550)
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871).
13. Civil Rights Bill of April 9, 1886, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1958); Stevens v. United States, supra note 12; Ex parte Francois,
supra note 12; In re Hobbs, supra note 12; Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190
(1877); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895); Lonas v. State,
0 Tenn. 287 (1871).
14. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Ex Parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602 (No.
7825) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879); In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6550)
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895);
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883).
15. U.S. CoxsT. art. I, § 10; State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C.C.S.D. Ga.
1890); E pare Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602 (No. 7825) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879);
It re Hobbs, supra note 14; Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); Dodson v.
State, supra note 14; State v. Gibson, supra note 14.
16. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1; Ex parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 669 (No.
5047) (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879); In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6550)
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196,
124 P.2d 240 (1942); McLaughlin v. Florida, 153 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1963), rev'd
379 U.S. 184 (1964); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871) ; State v. Brown,
236 La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959); Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749
(1955), remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), affd, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849
(1955 ), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Jackson v. City and County of Denver,
supra note 16; State v. Gibson, supra note 16; Naim v. Naim, supra, note 16.
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Aside from the aforementioned pseudo-scientific propositions,
the underlying foundation upon which these statutes have traditionally been sustained is that they represent a legitimate exercise of the state's power to regulate marriage. In determining
the validity of Oklahoma's statute, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that marriage is an essential institution of every
organized society and subject to the control and regulation of
the state as a matter of domestic concern within the state. 18 The
Supreme Court has recognized the right of the individual "to
marry" as a fundamental right guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment, 19 but it has also decreed marriage to be a "civil contract . . . usually regulated by law." 20 Thus, while every individual has the absolute right to marry, there is no right to marry
whomever one chooses. "[N]either in the letter nor the spirit of
the [federal] constitution can a citizen find his right to intermarry with any one whom he may select who is willing to accept
The concept of marriage as a civil contract is a carry-over
from English common law in which marriage was considered in
no other light.22 Accordingly, it is generally conceded that the
states may prohibit marriage between persons within the Levitical degrees and between idiots as a necessary and proper regulation,23 just as they may prohibit polygamous marriages. 24 It has
been asserted that the states may also "declare who may marry;
how they shall marry; and the consequences of their marrying"2 5
and "legislate upon all subjects connected with or growing out
of this relation. 2 6 "Marriage, as creating the most important
relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of people than any other institution, has always been
subject to the control of the legislature.127 Although considering
18. Stevens v. United States, 146 F2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (dictum) ; cf. Skinner v.

Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

20. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).

21. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 178 (1883).
22. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS, § 108 (7th ed. 1872).
23. See Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175

(1883) ; State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877).

24. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Davis v. Beason, 133

U.S. 33 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

25. State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251, 252 (1877), quoting from Brook v.
Brook, 9 H.L. 193.

26. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 403 (1871).
27. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
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interracial cohabitation rather than intermarriage between races,
the Court in Pace v. Alaba w2 8 indicated that such state regulation was constitutionally sound insofar as both parties to the
miscegenous marriage were punished equally.
With the focus on the individual freedoms and liberties in
recent years, the remaining miscegenation statutes have come
under sharp attack. In 1948 the California Supreme Court, in
the only case as yet to take such action, struck down a California
statute20 which deemed all miscegenous marriages null and
void. 30 In so holding, the court declared that the legislation,
under the equal protection clause, could only be sustained if
there was a clear and present danger established, or if there
was a reasonable classification by the legislature. Thus, the court
placed the burden on the legislature to overcome a presumption
that the statute was invalid since a racial classification was involved with respect to what the court determined to be the "fundamental right of free men." 3' The majority discounted any
notion that the statute could be sustained on the general assumptions as to traits of racial groups (for example, susceptibility of

non-caucasians to certain diseases). Instead, it determined that
standards must be "based on tests of the individual, not on arbitrary classifications of groups of races ....
',32 Should this
theory be accepted in other jurisdictions it may represent the
beginning of the end of a deep-seated tradition founded upon
such axioms as mental inferiority of Negroes and higher
incidence among them of certain loathsome, contagious diseases which may be passed on to spouse or offspring.3 3 The petitioners in Perez also asserted a claim that the statute constituted
a restraint upon the free exercise of religion guaranteed them
by the first amendment insofar as such restrictions were inconsistent with the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church which had
no prohibition against marriages between Negroes and Caucasians. Accordingly, they argued that should the statute be upheld, it would have the effect of depriving them of the sacrament
of matrimony. The court accorded little weight to this argument,
28. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
29. CAL. Civ. CODE § 60. "All marriages of white persons with negroes,

Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mullattoes are illegal and void."

30. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
31. Id. at 714, 198 P2d at 19.
32. Id. at 718, 198 P.2d at 21.
33. Seidelson, Miscegenation Statutes and the Supreme Court, 15
U.L. REV. 156, 163 (1966).
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however, and rightly so in view of the position taken by the
Supreme Court denying the Mormans the right to polygamous
marriages even where the penalty for failure to engage in such
practice "would be demnation [sic] in the life to come."3 4 It has
been suggested that this decision, with the resulting publicity
and attention focused thereon, was instrumental in bringing
about the repeal of miscegenation statutes in ten states since
1951.8 5
The old equal application doctrine expoused in Pace8 came
under sharp attack in Brown

. Board of Education with the

result that in recent cases, where the argument was made that
segregation statutes are valid on the ground that they apply
equally to both races, the Court has held that such equality is
"superficial."381 One year later, however, the Supreme Court of
Virginia, in Naim v. Naim,39 upheld that state's miscegenation
statute against challenges that it violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. In so holding, the court distinguished the decision rendered by the California Supreme Court in Perez on the theory that the California
statute was merely declaratory, "while all the others carried with
them punishments for violations, indicating an attitude of comparative indifference on the part of the California legislature
and the absence of any clearly expressed sentiment of policy."40
At the same time it reiterated a statement made in an earlier
Virginia decision, "that the preservation of racial integrity is
the unquestioned policy of this state, and that it is sound and
wholesome, cannot be gainsaid." 41 While there was no challenge
as to the reasonableness of the classification in this case, the court
relied upon Borden's Farm Products v. Baldwi?4 2 in declaring
that the burden of proof is on the contestant where any facts
can reasonably be conceived as would sustain it. The applicability of the decision in Brown was also considered, but the court
34. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878).

E.g., Cleveland v.

United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) ; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 33 (1890).
35. Applebaum, mspra note 5 at 50.
36. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 538 (1883).

37. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); Gross v. Board of Educ.,

373 U.S. 683 (1963).

39. Naim v. Naina, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
40. Id. at 85, 87 S.E2d at 753.
41. Id. at 83, 87 S.E2d at 752, quoting from Wood v. Commonwealth, 159
Va. 963, 965, 166 S.E. 477, 477 (1932).
42. 293 U.S. 194 (1934).
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determined that although education may be the very foundation
of good citizenship, "no such claim for the intermarriage of the
races could be supported; by no sort of valid reasoning could
it be found to be a foundation of good citizenship or a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms. In the
opinion of the legislatures of more than half the States it is
harmful to good citizenship."4 3 The decision in Naim afforded
the Supreme Court an excellent opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of these statutes, but the appeal was ultimately
44
dismissed.
While specifically reserving opinion as to statutes prohibiting
interracial marriage, the Supreme Court in 1964 invalidated a
Florida statute4 5 which imposed a higher penalty upon persons
found guilty of interracial cohabitation and fornication than
those convicted of the same offense but where both parties were
of the same race.40 In so holding the Court deemed the narrow
view of the equal protection clause expressed in Pace to have
been "swept away.1 47 Mr. Justice White, speaking for the ma-

jority, stated that the statute, in so far as it involved a racial
classification, should only be sustained where there is "some
overriding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the
specific conduct when engaged in by a white person and a Negro,
but not otherwise." 48 The acknowledged legislative purpose of
the statute being to prevent breaches of the basic concepts of
sexual decency, the Court was unable to find any rationale therein which made it essential to punish promiscuity of one racial
group and not that of another. There was found to be no indication that promiscuity by the interracial couple presented any
particular problems requiring separate or different treatment if
the suggested over-all policy of the statute was to be adequately
served.
43. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 88, 87 S.E.2d 749, 755 (1955).
44. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
45. FLA. STAT. AxN. § 798.05 (1965) prescribes a punishment by imprison-

ment not exceeding twelve months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars for each member of a racially mixed couple convicted of living habitually
and occupying in the nighttime the same room. § 798.03, however, prescribes
punishment by imprisonment not exceeding three months or fine not exceeding
thirty dollars for a non-racially mixed couple found guilty of fornication. In
addition, this latter section requires proof of intercourse which is not necessary
for conviction under the former.
46. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
47. Id. at 190.
48. Id. at 192.
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Such was the historical situation when the Supreme Court of
Virginia was again called upon to rule on the constitutionality
of its miscegenation statute4 9 in LoVing V. Virginia.5 0 The petitioners here had been convicted under a statute which served
to complement the principal miscegenation statute and under
which it was a felony to go out of the state of Virginia for the
purpose of being married with the intention of returning to and
thereafter residing in that state.-" The principal challenge to
the statute asserted by the petitioners was founded upon the
rationale that the Naim decision was rendered in reliance upon
Pace; the Pace decision was overruled in MeLaughlin; therefore,
the Naim decision was overruled. The court discounted this
theory in holding that the Pace decision was merely referred
to in Naim to indicate that the Supreme Court had made no decision at variance with the rule that a state may validly forbid
interracial marriages; furthermore, the Court in McLaughin
was concerned not with miscegenation but rather with interracial
cohabitation. In considering, further, whether the statute served
to deny the petitioners due process and equal protection, the
court determined that there is an overriding state interest in
the institution of marriage 52 which is not affected by any of the
recent federal decisions in the civil rights area. The court refused
to give credence to any of the sociological, biological, and anthropological aspects of the question of interracial marriages in
that such arguments were "properly addressable to the legislature which enacted the law in the first place, and not to [the]
court, whose prescribed role in the separated powers of government is to adjudicate, and not to legislate."53
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (1950).
If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored
person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and
shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not more than
five years.
50. 206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1966), prob. juris. noted 87 Sup. Ct. 595
(1966).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1950).
If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for
the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and
be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting
as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the
marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized
in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall
be evidence of their marriage.
52. This probably represents the court's anticipatory argument to the United
States Supreme Court should it follow, on appeal, the same approach adopted
in McLaughlin.

53. Loving v. Virginia, 206 Va. 924, 929, 147 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1966).
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Obviously, this case is not one of novel impression or, for that
matter, does it add anything at all to the state of the law in this
area as it stood some three hundred years ago. It does serve to
demonstrate the adamant rejection by the Virginia Supreme
Court of any notion that marriage as an institution is anything
less than a civil contract properly subject to state regulation in
the interest of public health, morals and welfare, "to the end
that family life

. . .

may be maintained in accordance with

established tradition and culture." 54
In terms of having any lasting significance in this area of the
law, this decision will probably be relegated to the position of a
mere "way station on the route to the United States Supreme
Court."5
LimwooD S. EVANS

54. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 89, 87 S.E2d 749, 756 (1955).
55. McLaughlin v. Florida, 153 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1963).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -DUTY
OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
TO ADVISE A DEFENDANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF A GUILTY PLEA*
The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently faced the issue
of whether there is a duty on a trial judge to question one accused of a criminal act in order to determine whether or not the
accused understands the consequences of his plea of guilty before
the court accepts such a plea. 1
The defendant was tried for murder and entered a plea of not
guilty. At the conclusion of the state's evidence the defendant's
counsel withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of
guilty with a recommendation of mercy. The defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment for life.2 The defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, which was granted. At
the hearings the petitioner claimed that his incarceration was
illegal because he did not understand the import of his plea of
guilty at the time he entered it and because the trial judge made
no effort to ascertain whether or not he understood the consequences of his plea. The court found that the petitioner's allegations were without merit and ordered that the writ of habeas
corpus be dismissed. Upon appeal the supreme court upheld the
lower court's ruling and held that, where an accused represented
by counsel was sufficiently informed of the consequences of his
plea of guilty, no further admonition by the court as to such
consequences was necessary, and failure to give such admonition
was not prejudicial error.3
A. Introduction and GeneraZ Background
This issue is one of novel impression in South Carolina and
has resulted in conflicting decisions in the United States. The
rule is well settled in a majority of jurisdictions that the fundamental right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the
crime with which he is charged has usually been regarded as
* Thompson v. State, 151 S.E2d 221 (S.C. 1966).
1. Thompson v. State, 151 S.E2d 221 (S.C. 1966).
2. S.C. CoDa Axx. §§ 16-52, 17-553.4 (1962); A plea of guilty to murder

with recommendation to the mercy of the court carries a mandatory penalty
of imprisonment during the whole lifetime of the prisoner. State v. Mowzon,
231 S.C. 655, 99 S.E.2d 672 (1957); State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E.2d

880 (1955).
3. Thompson v. State, 151 S.E2d 221 (S.C. 1966).

261
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including the right to be informed of the consequences of a plea
of guilty. Further, the court is required to determine, before
receiving a plea of guilty, that the accused does understand the
consequences of making such a plea and to inform him of such
consequences if he is not already advised.4
In some jurisdictions the rule that a trial judge must ascertain
whether or not an accused understands the consequences of his
plea of guilty before it is accepted has been established by statuter5 while in other jurisdictions the rule has been established
by case law.0 In the leading case of Commonwealth v. Battis,7
the Massachusetts court took the position that before acceptance
of a plea of guilty, the accused must be admonished as to the
consequences of such a plea and must be given a reasonable
amount of time to consider what the court had said to him regarding the plea." Since the Battis case the majority of courts
have declared that a plea of guilty should not be accepted until
after careful inquiry by the court into the accused's understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea.9 In applying the rule
the question of when the duty requires the court to either determine that the information was given, to direct that it shall be
given, or to give it to the defendant directly, depends upon the
state of the record and the facts appearing at the time the plea
is offered. While the rule is not universal, particularly with
respect to misdemeanor cases,' 0 it is the overwhelming view that
the fact that the accused is represented by counsel at the time
he offers a plea of guilty does not relieve the court of the duty
of ascertaining that he is informed of the consequences of his
plea and of advising him of such consequences if he is not so
4. E.g., Patten v. State, 50 Ariz. 32, 68 P.2d 669 (1937) ; State v. Kelli775, 72 S.W.2d 472 (1934); Cooper v. State, 231 Md. 248, 189 A.2d 620
(1963); Jones v. State, 221 Md. 141, 156 A.2d 421 (1959); Commonwealth
v. Battes, 1 Mass. 95 (1804); Caves v. State, 244 Miss. 853, 147 So. 2d 632
(1962) ; State v. Hill, 81 W. Va. 676, 95 S.E. 21 (1918).
5. Coio. Rv. ST.T. ANN. § 39-7-8 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 101.26(3)

son, 232 Iowa 9, 4 N.W.2d 239 (1942); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky.

(Smith-Hurd 1960); MIcH. ComP. LAws § 785.3 (2)

(1948) as quoted in

People v. Leach, 2 Mich. App. 713, 141 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1966) ; Mo. CRam.
RuLE 25.04 (1959)
1965); Tax. CoDE

as quoted in State v. Blaylock, 394 S.W.2d 364 (Mo.

Psoc. art. 26.13 (1966).
6. See cases cited note 4, supra.
7. 1 Mass. 95 (1804).
8. Ibid.
CIRA.

9. See cases cited note 4, supra.

10. Kissinger v. State, 147 Neb. 983, 25 N.W2d 829 (1947); People v.
Mason, 307 N.Y. 570, 122 N.E.2d 916 (1954); Mock v. State, 164 Tex. Cr.
335, 298 S.W.2d 583 (1957).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss2/7

14

1967]

et al.: COMMENTS
COMMENTS

informed." Under this rule, the information supplied, whether
by the court's admonition or from other sources, must be such
as is reasonably calculated to inform the defendant, considered
as an ordinarily intelligent person, of all the consequences, ef12
fects, and results of a plea of guilty.
Some jurisdictions are in accord with the new South Carolina
view that when the record shows that the accused, represented
by counsel, has been sufficiently informed of the consequences of
his plea of guilty, no further admonition by the court as to such
consequences is necessary, or, at least, that the failure to give
such further admonition is not prejudicial error.' 3

Most

juris-

dictions that accept the South Carolina and minority rule, limit
14
it to noncapital cases.
In the federal courts Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 5 provides that the court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, and "shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge." This rule confirms that an accused can
make a valid plea of guilty only with knowledge and appreciation of its consequences, and that it is the duty of the court to
see that he has such understanding before accepting the plea.' 6
The "understanding" required for making a valid plea of guilty
refers to the meaning of the charge and what acts amount to
being guilty of the charge, and should include "the consequences
of pleading guilty thereto." 17
11. Patten v. State, 50 Ariz. 32, 68 P2d 669 (1937); Penn v. State, 242
Ind. 359, 179 N.E.2d 283 (1961) ; Brown v. State, 223 Md. 401, 164 A.2d 722
(1960) ; Bullock v. Harpole, 233 Miss. 486, 102 So. 2d 687 (1958) ; State v.

Williams, 361 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1962); Ex parte Hall, 91 Okla. Crim. 11, 215

P.2d 587 (1950) ; Boggers v. Briers, 134 W. Va. 370, 59 S.E2d 480 (1950).
12. State v. Smith, 66 Ariz. 376, 189 P2d 205 (1948); Wanderhoof v.

People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); People v. Brown, 87 Colo. 261,
286 P. 859 (1930) ; People v. Rivers, 22 Ill. 2d 590, 177 N.E2d 154 (1961) ;
People v. Bumpus, 355 Mich. 374, 94 N.W2d 854 (1959) ; State v. Banford, 13
Utah 2d 63, 368 P2d 473 (1962).
13. State v. Padilla, 2 Ariz. App. 374, 409 P2d 90 (1965) ; State v. Perry,

265 N.C. 517, 144 S.E2d 591 (1965); Boggess v. Briers, 134 W. Va. 370, 59
S.E.2d 480 (1950).
14. People v. Emigh, 174 Cal. App. 2d 392, 344 P.2d 851 (1959) ; Jones v.

State, 221 Md. 141, 156 A.2d 421 (1959); State v. Cummings, 52 Wash. 2d

601, 328 P.2d 160 (1958).
15. "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and
shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the charge.... ." Fm). R.

CRIM. P. 11.

16. Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,

358 U.S. 847; United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957).
17. Edwards v. United States, supra, note 16.
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However in two federal cases, United States v. Swaggerty'8
and United States v. Shepherd,'9 it was held that Rule 11 imposes no obligation on a court to make such inquiry when the
defendant is represented by counsel. Although these cases represent the minority view, the majority of federal courts have held
that representation by counsel does not in itself fulfill the requirement of the rule, but is a circumstance which may fairly
be taken into account in determining the nature and extent of
20
the inquiry to be made.
B. Ro7e of the Defense Counsez
A plea of guilty is a confession of guilt made in a formal manner and is equivalent to and as binding as a conviction after a
trial on the merits. 2' It has the same effect in law as a verdict
of guilty and authorizes the imposition of the punishment prescribed by law. 2 2 Although some state courts prior to Gideon v.
lVainwright23 held that legal counsel was not necessary if the
defendant pleaded guilty,2 4 the right to counsel is now applied
to pleading proceedings-a critical stage of criminal procedure
25
requiring expert legal advice.
The right to counsel means more than the mere presence of a
legal aid; it demands the effective assistance of counsel.26 Defense counsel is important because the guilty plea involves a
waiver of all defenses and evidentiary questions which do not
relate to the jurisdiction of the court.27 Legal advice from a de18. 218 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1955).
19. 108 F. Supp. 721 (D.N.H. 1952).
20. United States v. Baysden, 326 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Diggs, 304 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Long v. United States, 290 F.2d 606
(9th Cir. 1961) ; Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958).
21. Bailey v. MacDougall, 247 S.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 425 (1965).
22. Ibid.
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N.W. 818 (1923); Commonwealth v. Ashe, 139 Pa. Super. 417, 12 A.2d 500 (1940).

25. Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941); Panagos v. United

States, 324 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1963). The federal practice is now controlled
by Fib. R. CRinr. P. 44: "If the defendant appears without counsel, the court
shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him
at every stage of the precedings unless he elects to proceed without counsel
or is able to obtain counsel."
26. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
27. United States v. Pate, 222 F. Supp. 988, (N.D. Ill. 1963); Willis v.
State, 42 Ala. App. 85, 152 So. 2d 883 (1963) ; People v. Brown, 13 Ill. 2d 32,
147 N.E.2d 336 (1958) ; Villasiona v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio 483, 190 N.E2d 265
(1963).
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fense attorney is essential to a criminal defendant, for a defendant and his counsel together can best decide when a guilty plea
should be entered. 28 An attorney is in a better position than the
defendant to evaluate and discuss any plea agreement. Moreover, the attorney will want to inquire about the court's sentencing practice in order to better assess the value of any proposition made by the prosecuting attorney. However, a defendant's
reliance on his counsel's erroneous sentence prediction is not a
recognized ground for withdrawal of a guilty plea. 29 Counsel's
advice that a more lenient sentence will probably be imposed if
the defendant pleads guilty, 30 or that pleading guilty will enable
the defendant to go before a lenient judge are not grounds for
withdrawal of the guilty plea when the advice is ultimately
proven erroneous. 31 This general rule has evolved to avoid inquiry into the practices and tactics of attorneys in handling their
cases.
When counsel has informed his client of the court's sentencing
procedure and the range of the sentence, and there is mere speculation as to what the sentencing judge will do if the defendant
pleads guilty, the application of the general rule seems appropriate. However, when a defendant can prove his attorney
assured him that if he pleaded guilty a specific sentence would
be imposed or probation would be considered by the court, and
the defendant relied thereon to his disadvantage, the general
rule is subject to question. If a withdrawal of a guilty plea were
permitted, trial judges would be required to make some determination as to whether there has been any misrepresentation by
the attorney. Any extensive inquiry into a defendant-attorney
relationship with regard to the tenuous distinction between good
tactical advice and assurances of a definite sentence disposition is
questionable, and therefore, the problem is best handled by
merely having the court make a general statement as to its sentencing policy and consequences of a plea.
28. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1945).
29. Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1953) ; In re Atchley,

48 Cal. 2d 409, 310 P.2d 15 (1957) ; Jacobs v. Warden, 232 Md. 627, 192 A.2d
786 (1963) ; People v. Battice, 6 App. Div. 2d 773, 174 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1959) ;
Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959); State v. Liles,
246 S.C. 59, 142 S.E2d 433 (1965).
30. Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1953); People v.

Toledo, 111 Cal. App. 204, 295 P. 353 (1931); State v. Liles, 246 S.C. 59, 142
S.E2d 433 (1965).
31. United States v. Berry, 309 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1962).
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Admittedly, it may be difficult, and perhaps unwise to analyze
the impact of a defense counsel's comments to his client, especially since much of the discussion may have been forgotten and
may invoke conflicting testimony. Where, however, a criminal
defendant has not had the opportunity to balance all relevant
considerations before entering a guilty plea, without the misrepresentation of a plea bargain being present to distort the
plea should be perdetermination, withdrawal of the guilty
2±
fairness."
for
"solicitude
a
mitted out of
0. A More Respo='ble Role for the Tril Judge
Some members of the judiciary play a participating role in
plea bargaining by attempting to persuade criminal defendants
to plead guilty.38 Often when this is done the judge gives a
direct or implied promise that some consideration will be granted
with respect to the sentence if the defendant enters a plea of
guilty.3 4 To a defendant, the trial judge holds an awesome posi-

tion, and any influence a judge uses may have a subtle coercive
effect on an individual already in an unsteady psychological
state. 5 Thus, an overly zealous judge, despite his sincere interest
in a defendant, may unwittingly coerce the defendant into pleading guilty. In the interest of fairness to criminal defendants,
trial judges should not become involved in attempts to persuade
a defendant to plead guilty.
The acceptance of a plea of guilty is one of the most serious
responsibilities of a trial judge. In each instance he is confronted with three constitutional guarantees which belong to
every defendant and are found in both federal and state constitutions: the assistance of counsel, 6 a trial by jury, 7 and due
8
process of law.
Before receiving a plea of guilty in a criminal case, the court
should be required to see that it is freely and voluntarily made
32. Cf. United States v. Shneer, 194 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1952); affirming
105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
33. Smith v. United States, 321 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Euziere v. United
States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); State v. Boulton, 229 Minn. 576, 40
N.W.2d 417 (1949) ; Rogers v. State, 243 Miss. 219, 136 So. 2d 331 (1962);
Commonwealth v. Senauskas, 362 Pa. 69, 191 A. 167 (1937).
34. See cases cited note 33, supra.
35. United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
36, U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18.

37. Ibid.
38. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, XIV; S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 5.
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by a person of competent intelligence, and with a full understanding of its nature and effect and of the facts upon which it
is founded.3 9
By following certain procedures and using certain precautions,
trial judges can have an effective means of protecting themselves
from false or unfounded charges, and at the same time safeguard
constitutional rights and interests of a defendant. The following
points are suggested to illustrate this position.
First, the trial court should insure that the defendant is ably
represented by counsel at all stages of the case.
Second, he should always very carefully confront the defendant with the exact nature of the charge. Along with this he
should explain to the defendant the nature of the possible punishment which the charge carries.
Third, he should make a searching inquiry into the facts and
circumstances of the case at the time the plea is taken. The judge
can more readily determine whether the defendant is entering
his plea on his own free will; that is, whether it is being given
completely voluntarily. It should be ascertained by the court
whether any promise has been made to the defendant with respect to punishment or probation in the case either by the
defendant's lawyer, the prosecuting attorney, the judge, or anyone else. The one way to avoid a misunderstanding between the
defendant and the court in this matter is for the judge to ascertain this from the defendant himself.
The fourth safeguard is that of the record itself. The questions
proposed by the judge or counsel to the defendant with respect
to facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, the questions
bearing on the voluntariness of the plea, those with respect to
whether any promises have been made, and any other questions
concerning waiver of constitutional rights, such as the waiver
of a jury trial and whether the defendant understands the nature
of the charge and the seriousness of his action in pleading guilty,
should all be made a matter of record.40
While one may say that this procedure takes us somewhat beyond the requirements under the fourteenth amendment and
South Carolina Constitution, no judge can take pride in holding
his procedure to the very minimum of fairness as required by
39. Nicely v. Butcher, 81 W. Va., 247, 94 S.E. 147 (1917).
40. Address by Judge William J. Thompson, West Virginia Judicial Association Banquet, October 23, 1959.
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law. After all, here we are dealing primarily with the life and
liberty of an individual.
D. Gonciuion
Although South Carolina has adopted a contrary view, it is
respectfully submitted that the better rule is that of recognizing
the existence of a duty on the part of the trial judge to advise
a defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea. This would
insure the element of fairness in criminal proceedings which
our judicial system seeks to fortify. Certainly the trial judge
has the best opportunity to determine whether or not a plea
is understandingly made for he has the advantage of witnessing
the demeanor of the accused. Further, the rule would add to
the finality of judicial proceedings in that it would eliminate,
as a ground for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, any question that an accused did not understand what he was doing when
he entered a plea of guilty. The rule would not involve any
radical change in South Carolina criminal procedure for most
of the trial judges in this state conduct a rather thorough inquiry into whether or not the accused understands the effect of
his plea.

41

MUE

LOADHOLr

41. See Carroll v. MacDougall, 149 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. 1966).
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INSURANCE--UNINSURED MOTORIST ACT-DEFINITION
OF UNINSURED MOTORIST INCLUDES INSURED
MOTORIST WHOSE INSURANCE IS BELOW
MANDATORY STATUTORY LIMITS*
A. Introduction
Shortly after the introduction of the use of the automobile as
a means of transportation, the dangers inherent in these vehicles were recognized. Their development and expanded use
necessitated the utilization of the state's police power to enforce
reasonable standards of road conduct. Law enforcement officials
today control the issuance of licenses, speed of vehicles, rules of
the road, and other related matters through a host of statutory
regulations designed to curb highway accidents. Attacking from
another front, state legislatures have attempted to shift the burden of loss from the injured party to the insurance company,
an organization especially designed to absorb loss and distribute
it throughout society.
Uninsured motorists have always been a problem for the losses
they cause have largely gone uncompensated. Victims of negligent uninsured motorists suffered from the increasing number
of accidents caused by hit-and-run drivers, operators of stolen
cars, cars driven without the owner's permission, unregistered
cars, and out of state motorists. The nation's great concern for
a solution to this dilemma has prompted state legislatures to
re-evaluate automobile liability insurance statutes.
In recent years significant progress has been made toward
protecting citizens from uninsured and financially irresponsible
motorists. Among several solutions proposed or attempted have
been financial responsibility laws,1 compulsory insurance,2 un* Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447 (R.I. 1966).
1. These laws involve a regulated system of proof of financial responsibility. Today, every state has some form of financial responsibility statute as
a partial solution to the problem of the irresponsible motorist. For an alphabetical listing of all the states except Alaska and the relevant statutory citations, see Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present, and Future, 8 Buvi'ALo L. Rav. 215, 218 n.8 (1959).

This type of statute is unquestionably constitutional as a valid exercise of
police power. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954).
2. Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina have compulsory insurance laws, and Connecticut, Maryland, and Rhode Island have similar laws
applicable to minors. Insurance Advocate, Nov. 28, 1964, p. 22 (Chart, Automobile Financial Responsibility and Related Laws, compiled by the Law
Department, Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, October, 1964).
This type statute is also a constitutionally valid exercise of police power.
269
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satisfied claim and judgement funds,3 and the Saskatchewan
Plan.4 Because of its dislike for state-imposed programs of compulsory insurance and public unsatisfied judgement funds, the
insurance industry's plan was the uninsured motorist endorsement.5 ]New Hampshire, in 1957, became the first state to require
that uninsured motorist coverage be made a standard feature
of every policy of automobile liability insurance issued in the
states which
state.0 At the present time there are twenty-eight
7
have enacted similar uninsured motorist acts.

Designed to further close the gaps inherent in compulsory
insurance and financial responsibility legislation, this insurance
coverage is intended to provide, within fixed limits, financial
compensation to innocent persons who receive injuries, and the
dependents of those who are killed, by the wrongful conduct of
motorists who, because they are uninsured and not financially
8
responsible, cannot be made to respond to damages.
See 2 RC.L. 1171 (1914); Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1028 (1925); Annot, 69 A.L.R.
397 (1930). For a concise history of this type legislation, see Risford and
Austin, The Problem of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 24 U. KAN.
Ciry L. REV. 82 (1955).
3. Unsatisfied claim and judgment fund laws are operative with variable
forms in Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and North Dakota. These are
funds under state control which allow a resident, injured by a financially
irresponsible motorist in the state, to recover limited compensation. See generally Loiseatx, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 TEXAS L. Rav. 154 (1959);
Plummer, The Uncompensated Automobile Accident Victim, 24 INs. CouNSEL
J. 78 (1957).
4. For an analysis of this new plan see Lang, The Nature and Potential of
the Saskatchewan Insurance Experiment, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 352 (1962).
5. One writer on the subject has attributed the recent development of the
uninsured motorist endorsement to "the clamor of sociologists for the protection of the innocent victim, the threat of legislatures to enact compulsory
insurance laws, and the fear of insurance companies that they would be forced
to underwrite undesirable risk. . .

."

Hentemann, Uninsured Motorist Cov-

erage, 12 CLav.-MAF. L. REv. 66 (1963).
6. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268:15 (1966).
7. The states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin. National Association of Independent Insurers News Memo, June 6, 1966.
8. The purpose of the uninsured motorist acts is to provide "adequate compensation for injured insureds when other sources are lacking," Hobbs v.
Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Va. 1962); "to correct
the evil that arose because victims of uninsured negligent drivers were left
without compensation for their damages," Drewry v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 201 Va. 231, 235, 129 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1963); and "to provide financial recompense to innocent persons who are injured and to dependents of
those who are killed because of the wrongful conduct of uninsured motorists,"
American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wash. 2d 811, 812, 270 P2d 867,
868 (1962). See Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1252 (1961).
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Under the uninsured motorist acts,9 licensed insurance companies, as a condition of their doing business in the state, are
required to provide uninsured motorist liability endorsements
in their automobile liability policies. The Standard Insurance
Policy uninsured motorist endorsement provides that the insurer
agrees:
[T]o pay all sums which the insured or his legal representatives shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because
of bodily injury . ..including death . . .sustained by the
insured, caused by accident, and arising out of the owner10
ship, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile ....
To recover under an uninsured motorist endorsement, the insured must have; (1) sustained injuries, (2) which were caused
by an uninsured motorist, (3) from whom he would be legally
entitled to recover. An "uninsured automobile" is defined by the
Standard Policy as:
[A]n automobile

. .

. [to] which there is ... no bodily

injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the
time of the accident . . . or with respect to which there is

a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident but the company writing the
same denies coverage thereunder ...

or a hit and run

driver. 1
9. For detailed accounts of the history, development, provisions, and recent

cases of the uninsured motorist acts of several states, see generally: Chadwick

and Poch6, California's Uninsred Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems, 13
HASTINGS L.J. 194 (1961); Doar and Richardson, The South Carolina Unin-

sured Motorist Law, 15 S.C.L. REv. 739 (1963) ; Ward, New York's Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present, and Future, 8
BUFFALO L. Rxv. 215 (1959); Comment, 48 CA.IF. L. Rv.516 (1960); Note,
14 U. FLA. L. Rav. 455 (1962); Note, 39 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 321 (1965);
Note, 47 VA.L. Rav. 145 (1961); Note, 48 VA. L. REv. 1177 (1963); Comment, 7 Wmr. & MARY L. REv. 106 (1966).
10. Part IV, Protection Against Uninsured Motorists, Coverage J, Policy
Form 3650(p) (rev. 1-63). The Standard Policy uninsured motorist endorse-

ment (hereinafter referred to as the Standard Policy) was promulgated by the

joint Committee in connection with the National Standard Policy Provisions
Program of the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau and the National Bureau of

Casualty Underwriters.

11. Ibid. The author understands that various revisions of the Standard

Policy are made periodically, but is uncertain of the number of states which
still permit the use of the uninsured motorist endorsements which define an

uninsured automobile as one with no automobile bodily liability insurance. The
Fidelity, Casualty, and Surety Bulletins indicate that the definition should

cover an automobile insured for insufficient limits, to the extent of the insufficiency, when the tort-feasor's insurance coverage is less than required by the
financial responsibility law. Uninsured Motorists, Fidelity, Casualty & Surety
Bull., Feb. 1963, p.4.
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According to the Standard Policy an "uninsured automobile"
does not include an insured automobile or an automobile which
within the meaning of the financial responsiis self-insured
12
bility laws.
Under the coverage, the insured may file suit against the uninsured motorist, if known, but he must notify his insurer.13
Determination of liability and damages in most states is made
by agreement between the insurer and the insured, or if agreement cannot be reached, arbitration is available, and finally
resort to the courts may be had. It should be noted, however,
that some states, including Virginia' 4 and South Carolina, 1 5
expressly reject arbitration clauses in automobile liability policies. But, to the extent of its payment to its own insured,
whether by agreement, arbitration, or judgment, the insurance
carrier is subrogated to the right of the insured to recover
against the uninsured motorist.' For this reason the uninsured
motorist endorsement has been said to be less like a liability
policy and more like a surety bond.' 7 It should also be noted
that although these statutes are remedial in nature,' they are
not intended in any event to provide insurance for the uninsured.' 0
B. The Problem,
Problems of statutory and policy construction have recently
been flooding the courts. Among the questions being presented
is whether a negligent driver is to be considered "uninsured" if
he has liability insurance which is under the minimum statutory
limits, and where the statute appears to be silent, may the insurance carrier define an uninsured automobile to mean only one
to which there is no automobile bodily injury liability insurance
applicable at the time of the accident?
12. Standard Policy, supra note 10.

13. Standard Policy, supra note 12, Conditions.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(g) (Supp. 1966).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.37 (Supp. 1966).
16. Standard Policy, supra note 13, Conditions.
17. Comment, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 516, 520 (1960).
18. Diamond v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 235 N.Y.S2d
505, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Harlow, 191 Va. 64,

68, 59 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1950).

19. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drewry, 191 F. Supp. 852 (W.D.

Va. 1961) ; Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fulton, 244 S.C. 559, 137
S.E.2d 769 (1964); Laird v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134
S.E.2d 206 (1964) ; Drewry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Va. 231,
129 S.E.2d 681 (1963); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harleysvile Mut. Gas.
Co., 203 Va. 600, 125 S.E.2d 840 (1962).
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This problem was squarely faced by the Supreme Court of
20
Rhode Island in the recent case of Allstate Ins. Co. va.Fusoo.
The insured was covered by Allstate's "Crusader Policy" which
contained an uninsured motorist endorsement, similar to the
Standard Policy Endorsement, 21 as required by the Rhode Island
Uninsured Motorist Act.2 2 The policy also provided that the

maximum limits of liability would be 10,000 dollars for any one
person and 20,000 dollars for any single accident, thus conforming to the minimum prescribed statutory limits. 23 The insured's

uninsured motorist endorsement defined an "uninsured automobile" as one as to which "no bodily injury liability insurance
[is] applicable at the time of the accident." 24
The insured was killed while riding as a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by Baumgardner whose insurance
policy with Transamerica Insurance Company had coverage
limits of 5,000 dollars for any person and 10,000 dollars for any
single accident.2 5 The insured's wife, made a beneficiary under
20. 223 A.2d 447 (R.L 1966).
21. The Allstate policy provision is as follows:
Section II-Protection Against Bodily Injury By Uninsured Automobiles
S-Bodily Injury Benefit Insurance Allstate will pay all
-Coverage
sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily
injury, sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of such automobile.
Note that Allstate Insurance Company does not include the words "or his legal
representative" in their "Crusader Policy" as does the Standard Policy. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, supra note 20, at 448.
22. RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 27-7-2.1 (Supp. 1965), in part reads:
No policy insuring loss resulting from liability imposed by law for
bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or
supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in
section 31-32-6 as amended, under provisions approved by the Insurance
Commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom, provided
that the named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage.
23. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-31-7 (Supp. 1965).
24. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447 (R.I. 1966).
25. R.I. GEx. LAws ANN. § 31-31-7 (Supp. 1965). This statute was enacted
about three months prior to this accident. The statute raised the minimum
statutory limits required for an automobile liability insurance policy from

$5,000/$10,000 to $10,000/$20,000. Allstate claimed that a notice from the
registrar of motor vehicles concerning the new applicable limits stated that on
January 1, 1965 and thereafter, until such policies as that delivered to Baumgardner had expired, all such policies would constitute financial responsibility.
The court dismissed the contention of Allstate's reliance on this notice, stating
that whatever problem of bookkeeping the registrar may have intended to spare
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the terms of the amendatory endorsement, made demands on
Allstate for payment of the difference between the basic limits
of the two policies claiming that as to such difference Baumgardner was an uninsured motorist for whose negligence Allstate was required to respond in damages. 28 The trial judge
agreed with Allstate that Baumgardner was not an uninsured
motorist because of Allstate's definition of an "uninsured auto27
mobile" as one which had no bodily injury liability insurance.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed this judgment in
a case of first impression.
In deciding for Mrs. Fusco, the court reasoned that Rhode
Island's Uninsured Motorist Act expressly provided that all
automobile liability policies delivered or issued for delivery to
a motorist in that state should include an uninsured motorist
endorsement allowing the insured the right to recover damages
for bodily injury resulting from the negligence of an uninsured
motorist. The court further stated that this statute, by specific
reference to another section, 28 incorporated minimum limits of
liability of 10,000 dollars for any person and 20,000 dollars for
a single accident. The court pointed out that in Rhode Island
it had been held that the legislative requirement of financial
responsibility, as a condition precedent to the operation of motor
vehicles on public highways, was a valid exercise of the police
power of the state,29 and that in such cases where the legislature
insurance carriers, he could not impair the substantive rights of insureds who
had negotiated with such carriers after January 1, 1965. Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Fusco, 223 A.2d 447, 451-52 (RI. 1966). This view seems to be out of
step with the scarce but recent authority on this point. See generally Ball v.
California Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 20 Cal. Reptr. 31, 201 Cal. App. 2d
85 (1962); 1961 Op.Avr'v GEN. FLA., 061-101; Note, 47 VA. L. REv. 145,
153 n.51 (1961).
26. Prior to the trial, this contention was made to Allstate by Mrs. Fusco
who, as the surviving spouse, was made the decedent's beneficiary by the terms
of the "Crusader Policy" amendatory endorsement. Mrs. Fusco's claim being
denied by Allstate, she then proceeded with arbitration, as required by the
policy when the parties were unable to agree. Allstate countered that even
though Baumgardner's liability coverage was less than that of Allstate's, the
automobile in which the decedent was killed was not "uninsured" as defined
by Allstate's policy. It further contended that, in any event, Mrs. Fusco's
argument did not come within the contemplation of the arbitration clause.
Allstate then instituted the present action to enjoin the defendant, Mrs. Fusco,
from pursuing her arbitration demands. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A2d
447, 448-49 (R.I. 1966). It should be noted again that most states allow these
arbitration clauses, although South Carolina and Virginia expressly invalidate
them in automobile insurance contracts.
27. 223 A.2d 447, 449 (R.I. 1966).
28. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-31-7 (Supp. 1965).
29. Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958).
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has acted on a subject within its constitutional power, public
policy is what the statute enacts. 30 The court recognized that
since the legislature had found it:
advisable in the public interest to require insurance carriers authorized to do business in this state to provide
protection against the negligent operation of uninsured
automobiles in favor of those motorists who voluntarily
contract with licensed carriers for liability coverage, 3 1
such contracts were required to conform to the statutory conditions imposed by the legislature. 32 Justice Powers, speaking for
the court, held that as a matter of public policy and legislative
intendment "no bodily injury insurance applicable at the time
of the accident," as Allstate had defined an "uninsured automobile," had to be construed to include any difference between
liability insurance carried by the tort-feasor, Baumgardner, and
the minimum limits required by the legislature. 33 The court
could see no weight in Allstate's argument that it would be fully
liable if Baumgardner had no insurance, but it should be fully
exonerated because he had some insurance.
C. Express, Contradictoryand Ambiguous Statutory Definitions
Generally, all uninsured motorist acts are alike in that they
require all automobile bodily injury liability policies to include
uninsured motorist endorsements obligating insurance carriers
to respond, within limits set by the legislature, for damages
caused by uninsured drivers.34 Problems arise immediately, however, when one tries to determine what the legislature intended
by an uninsured motorist.
The twenty-eight uninsured motorist acts, at least with respect
to the definition of an "uninsured automobile," may be conveniently divided into three classes: (1) Those which expressly
define an "uninsured automobile" as one which does not have
automobile bodily injury liability insurance or bond in the minimum statutory limits applicable at the time of the accident; (2)
30. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447, 450 (R.I. 1966). The court
cited Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911)
and Parchen v. Chessman, 49 Mont. 326, 142 Pac. 631 (1914).
31. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fusco, 223 A.2d 447, 450 (R.I. 1966).
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 450-51.
34. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 268:15 (1966), the first uninsured motorist
act, is a typical example.
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Those which define an "uninsured automobile" as one which has
no automobile bodily injury liability insurance or bond applicable at the time of the accident; and (3) Those which do not
expressly define an "uninsured automobile."
Georgia,8 5 Kentucky, 6 New York, 7 North Carolina; 88 South
Carolina"0 and Virginia40 are examples of the first group. Since
it was one of the first states in this group to enact the statute,
Virginia will be taken as an example. The Virginia statute
states:
[T]he term "uninsuredmotor 'vekile" means a motor vehicle
as to which there is (i) no bodily injury liability insurance
and property damage liability insurance, both in the
amounts specified by Section 46.1-1(8), as amended from
time to time ....

41

Various writers on the subject correctly concluded that by the
terms of such a statute, an automobile, driven by a resident or
a non-resident, would be recognized as uninsured if it had lower
limits of liability than the statute commanded. 42 A recent federal case, 43 recognizing this fact, considered a negligent out of
state motorist, carrying insurance providing less coverage than
the Virginia statute required, as being an uninsured motorist.
Noting that, by the terms of the statute, a vehicle is considered
uninsured if it is covered by less than the statutory limits, the
court held the insured's carrier liable under its uninsured motorist endorsement. 44 Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina and South
Carolina have substantially the same definitions of an uninsured
automobile in their acts and they would no doubt find little
difficulty reaching the same result by following this plain meaning approach. The New York statute4 5 is not so clear, but at
35. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-407.1 (Supp. 1966).
36. Ky. REv. STAT. § 74 (Baldwin 1966).
37. N.Y. Is. LAW, §§ 600 to 626.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (3) (Supp. 1966).
39. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 46-750.33, 46-750.31(3) (a) (Supp. 1966).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1966).
41. Ibid.
42. See Doar and Richardson, The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist

Law, 15 S.C.L. REv. 739, 742 (1963); Note, 12 DRuAKE L. REv. 119, 121 n.21

L. REv. 145, 149 (1961); Note, 1962
WASH. U.L.Q. 134, 138.
43. White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966).
44. Id. at 786. It would seem that valid compliance with another state's
statute would not preclude use of the White rationale.
45. N.Y. INS. LAW, §§ 600 to 626.
and accompanying text; Note, 47 VA.
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least one lower court in that state seems to have reached the
same conclusion by a process of legal gymnastics and definition
juggling.46 The remaining question, whether the insurance carrier may define away this obligation in the case of an accident
involving a negligent motorist carrying some insurance, is clear.
If the above named states recognize that the definition of an
uninsured motorist, as expressed in the statutes, means any automobile not insured up to the statutory limits, the well-recognized
rule is that such statutory requirements are read into each policy
issued, and become, by implication, a part of7 the contract which
4
cannot be contracted away by either party.

California's Uninsured Motorist Act defines an uninsured
automobile as one "[on] which there is no bodily liability insurance or bond applicable at the time of the accident.1 48 Despite
this fairly plain language, in a California case,49 the court considered the definition in conflict with the legislature's intention
that the statute afford the injured party coverage up to the
statutory limit" required by the financial responsibility law.
For this reason the court construed the definition to include an
automobile carrying insurance or bond in limits less than the
financial responsibility requirements. California also recognizes
the general rule that these statutory sections are, as a matter of
public policy, incorporated into and become a part of the insur51
ance policy itself, as if it were written therein.
The vast majority of states have uninsured motorist acts
which neglect to define an uninsured automobile. 52 In such states,
46. Cruzado v. Underwood, 39 Misc. 2d 859, 242 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
47. 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW
48. CAL. INS. COD- § 11580.2.

§ 7382 (1943).

49. Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Reptr. 63, 225 Cal.

App. 2d 80 (1964).

The case seems to have overcome the harsh results pre-

dicted if the plain meaning were followed. See Chadwick and Poche, California's Uninsured Motorist Statute. Scope and Problems, 13 HASTINGS LJ.

194, 195 (1961).
50. CAL_ INS. CODE: §§ 16059 and 16541.
51. Hendricks v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 22 Cal. Reptr. 682, 205 Cal. App. 2d
133 (1962).
52. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 36, § 74(62a) (Supp. 1966); Aaz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01 (Supp. 1966); COLO. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19
(Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851 (Supp. 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 73, § 755a (Smith-Hurd 1965); LA. Rav. STAT. § 1406(D) (Supp. 1966);
Micx. STAT. ANN. § 500.3010 (Supp. 1966); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 268:15
(Supp. 1966) ; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1966) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (Supp. 1966); ILI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 27-7-2.1 (Supp.
1965); Wis. STAT. § 204.30(5) (Supp. 1966).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVvmw
[Vol. 19

it could be argued, as it was in Fusco, that a negligent driver
carrying insurance below the required statutory limits nevertheless carries some insurance, and therefore should not be considered uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist act. The
Fusco case is clear authority for rejection of this argument.
There is virtually no case law in this area. One possible explanation for this is that most states providing such coverage ordinarily permit arbitration clauses in the insurance contract. Thus
the vast majority of claims rarely reach litigation stages. 53 Virginia 4 and South Carolina5 5 stand as notable exceptions to this
general rule.""
The underlying reasoning of the Fusco case seems to be acceptable in light of the general rule requiring insurance contracts
not to offend rules of law or contravene public policy. 57 This
rule limits the general proposition that, in the absence of ambiguity, the terms of an insurance policy should govern its
58
interpretation.
It is contended that the courts in jurisdictions not expressly
defining an uninsured automobile in their uninsured motorist
acts will either accept the Fusco decision as controlling or at
least follow its public policy argument. This position seems only
natural when one considers the legislative history of these acts,
their remedial nature and the tendency among the courts to
liberally construe insurance contracts in favor of insureds. 59
D. The South CarolinaAct
Current estimates of the number of declared uninsured motor
vehicles compared with the total automobiles registered, coupled
with estimates of the number of automobile accidents involving
uninsured motorists, demonstrates that South Carolina needed
53. See generally, Miller, The New "Uninsured Motorist" Endorsement to
Family Automobile Policies-The 1960 Look, 24 Ixs. COUNSEL J. 134 (1957);
Plummer, Handling Claims Under the Unin.ured Motorist Coverage, 1957 INS.

L.J. 494.

54. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(g) (Supp. 1966).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.37 (Supp. 1966).
56. See notes 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
57. 13 APPLMAN, INSURANCE LAW § 7381 (1943).
58. 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW § 7384 (1943).
59. 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW § 7401 (1943). The rule, recognized by
almost all jurisdictions, is that insurance contracts must be liberally construed
in favor of the insured or his beneficiary if possible, and strictly construed
against the insurer.
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legislation such as the Uninsured Motorist Act,0° which was
enacted in South Carolina in 1959.61
The South Carolina act, patterned after the earlier Virginia
act,6 2 specifically defines an "uninsured motor vehicle" as one
as to which there is no bodily liability insurance in the amounts
of 10,000 dollars for any one person and 20,000 dollars for any
one accident applicable at the time of such accident. 3 Considering the plain meaning of the definition in the South Carolina
statute, there should be little controversy on this point. 4 Writers 65 have consistently recognized that, by its plain meaning, the
South Carolina act "requires minimum coverage and should a
motor vehicle carry liability insurance in an amount less than
the amounts specified, such motor vehicle would be considered an
uninsured motor vehicle."0 0 Furthermore, it has been held by
South Carolina cases, construing other portions of this law, that
insurance contracts which conflict with the mandatory statutory
requirements are void, and the pertinent provisions of the statute
67
prevail as much as if expressly incorporated into the policy.
South Carolina's statute now expressly provides that: "The
Chief Insurance Commissioner may prescribe the form to
be used in providing such [uninsured motorist] coverage and
when prescribed and promulgated no other form may be used.",
Pursuant to this delegation of authority, Chief Insurance Com60. As of October 31, 1966, there were 12,195 declared uninsured motor
vehicles, an estimated 920,000 overall registrations, and an estimated 6,500
automobile accidents involving uninsured motorists. Statistics obtained from
Uninsured Motorist Section, South Carolina Highway Department.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.33, 46-750.31 (3) (a) (Supp. 1966).
62. Laird v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 392, 134 S.E.2d 206,
208 (1964).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(3) (a) (Supp. 1966) (incorporating by
reference § 46-750.32).
64. One recent Federal case, noting the clarity of the South Carolina statute,
defined an "insured vehicle" as one as to which there is "bodily injury liability
insurance and property damage liability insurance, both in the arnounts specified in § 46-750.13" (now § 46-750.32). American Liberty Ins. Co. v. DeWitte,
236 F. Supp. 636, 639 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
65. Note, 12 DRAx L. REv. 119, 121 n.21 (1963); Note, 1962 WASH.
U.L.Q. 134, 138.
66. Doar and Richardson, The South Carolina Uninisured Motorist Law, 15
S.C.L. REv. 739, 742 (1963).
67. E.g., Pacific Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 282,
285, 147 S.E.2d 273, 275 (1966); Williams v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co., 246 S.C. 396, 400, 143 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1965); Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fulton, 244 S.C. 559, 564-65, 137 S.E.2d 769, 771-72
(1964) ; Laird v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 395-96, 134 S.E.2d

206, 209 (1964).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1966).
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missioner William F. Austin, in 1963, issued a bulletin prescribing Forms A724c and A725c, as published by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, as the Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Endorsement for use in South Carolina. All
insurance companies licensed to write casualty insurance were
further ordered to file these endorsements with the South Carolina Insurance Department in accordance with the statute. 69
Both Forms A724c and A725c define an uninsured automobile
identically as follows:
[A]n automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance
or use of which there is, in the amounts specified in the
South Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
-. . [no] bodily injury and property damage liability bond
or insurance policy, applicable at the time of the accident
with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such automobile ....
70
Thus, South Carolina's act, by statutory definition and State
Insurance Department order, clearly precludes an insurance carrier issuing policies in this state from defining an uninsured
automobile so as to exclude from coverage accidents with drivers
who have insurance coverage lower than the statutory limits.

E. C'onousion
To insurance carriers, the Fusco decision is another thorn in
the industry's side. The result was just, although it may yet be
argued before another court that such a legislative intent as the
Fusco court found should have been legislatively manifested
rather than inferred by the judiciary in the name of an appealing but undefinable term called public policy. The Fusco rationale, however, seems to be the only logical approach to the problem. How could it be fairly argued that a responsible, insured
victim should be denied recovery from his insurance company
when involved in an accident with a negligent motorist when the
tort-feasor had some insurance and allowed recovery when the
tort-feasor had no insurance?
CHARLES

ARTHuR TAYLOR,

I

69. Bulletin No. 12-3, Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Endorsements, Chief Insurance Commissioner William F. Austin, December 19, 1963.
70. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Insurance, South Carolina Policies A724c and A725c,
II(c) (1).
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